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TRUMAN AND THE A-BOMB DECISION:
THE RHETORIC OF INCREMENTALISM
J. M. Williams
Between the acting of a dreadful thing.
And the first motion, all the interim is
Like a Phantasma, or a hideous.Dream;
The genius and the mortal instruments
Are then in council; and the state of man.
Like to a little Kingdom, suffers then
The Nature of an insurrection. '

Julius Gaesar, Brutus II, i

No man has ever walked with less preparation into a greater tangle of
problems than did Harry S Truman when he stepped across the Consti
tutional threshold that separates the Vice-Presidency from the Presidency.
According to Cabell Philhps, after his inaugiiration on January 20, 1945,
he saw President Roosevelt privately only three times, and each occasion
was brief and inconsequential. In his established role as presiding officer
of the Senate, he was almost totally isolated from the flow of issues and
decisions in the executive branch of government. What he knew of the
grand strategies of war and peace, then approaching an apocalyptic chmax,
he picked up largely from the papers and the gossip of the Senatorial cloak
rooms.^ "The President," Woodrow Wilson wrote nearly half a century

agoi "is at liberty both in law and in conscience to be as big a man as he
caij."'^ But a Vice-President can be only as big a man as his President wants
or permits him to be. Roosevelt groomed no one tb be his successor, and if
h^ ever regarded Harry Truman as anything more than a congenial make
weight on the Democratic ticket in 1944, it is lost to history.® Truman, in

turn, had avoided any attempt to prepare himself for higher office. "I had
been afraid for many weeks that something might happen to this great
leader," he recalled years later, but "I did not allow myself to think about
it after I became Vice-President."''

J. M. Williams is an Associate Professor of Communication and Media Studies
with a degree in Presidential Rhetoric from the University of Pittsburgh, and cur
rently serves as president-elect of the Speech Communication Association of
Pennsylvania.
^ Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, The History of a Triumphant Suc
cession (New York: The MacmiUan Company, 1966), p. 52.
Ibid.
= Ibid.

'Harry S Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decision. I (Garden City: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1956), p. 6; See also Margaret Truman Daniels, Harry S Truman
(Garden City: Williams Morrow & Co., Inc., 1973), p. 205.
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Of all the vast complexities that leaped out at Truman when he was
thrust into the White House with Roosevelt's sudden passing on April 12,
1945, none was more formidable and demanding than the atomic bomb.
After a brief first Cabinet meeting, hastily convened after Truman was
sworn into office. Secretary of War Henry Stdmson remained behind. He
would explain the details later, he said, but before departing he wanted to
inform the President of a new explosive under development of almost
unbelievable destructive power. That was all he wished to say at the
moment.® These terse, enigmatic remarks became Truman's introduction to
a decision-making scenario of epic proportions: the decision to use the
atomic bomb against Japan.
As is frequently the case, hindsight clouds rather than clarifies our view.
The notion is that Truman staked his 'Give 'em hell, Harry' reputation on
the A-bomb decision and won. The facts, some of them only quite recently
declassified and unveiled for public scrutiny in a valuable book by historian
Martin J. Sherwin, offer a different interpretation. Was Truman an
unwitting bystander or an unwilling participant in tire decision-making
process? Real world decision-making can be subjected to argumentative
analysis as discussed in the works of Braybrooke and Lindblom, Graham T.
Allison and living L. Janis.® The present essay attempts such analysis and
examines two propositions: 1) Truman's role as presidential decisionmaker
was one of passive acquiescence, characterized by blind allegiance to the
policy leanings of his predecessor. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and strict ad
herence to the advice of the seasoned counselors who surrounded him as

Roosevelt appointees. 2) The series of decisive actions surrounding the
development and deployment of the bomb, which emanated from the
political and scientific communities between 1939-1945, reflect a rhetoric
of incrementahsm. Left unimpeded, the process of incremental decision-

making contiibuted to the creation of an A-bomb policy too formidable
to halt.

Decision By Default

Truman approached the decision to use the atomic bomb from the distinct
disadvantage of one kept purposely and thoroughly in the dark, having
been uninformed prior to Roosevelt's death in April, 1945, that the United
States was engaged in the Manhattan Project and was nearing completion
of what promised to be the most devastating and destructive weapon in the
history of the world. While it is true that secrecy was imperative for
national security, it impinged on the decision-making process at the presi
dential level by denying Truman access to necessary information. He did
not know, upon taking office for example, of the secret aide memoire of
September 19, 1944, initialed by Roosevelt and Ghurchill which, couched
in the tones of diplomatic reservation, suggested however discreetly that
the bomb "might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the
° Harry S Truman, Memoirs, p. 10.
"See David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision,
Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York: The Free Press, 1963); Graham
T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, A

Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1972).
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Japanese.'"' Though hardly an irreversible declaration of intention, it
early predicts a gain in momentum for the decision to use the bomb. In this

extraordinary situation, Truman as president was not in control. According
to Major General Leslie R. Groves, commanding general of the Manhattan
Engineer District (code name for the A-bomb project), Trxrman "was like a
little boy on a tobaggan," who perhaps never even had an opportunity to
say yes.® Ghurchill was to write in his memoirs: "We can now see the
deadly hiatus which existed between the fading of President Roosevelt's
strength and the growth of President Truman's grip of the vast world
problem. In this melancholy void, one president could not act and the
other could not know."® Trirman mistr-usted his own judgment, and the men

who might have backed him up, such as Ghurchill and Harriman, were
figures whom he knew but slightly or not at all. On the other hand, the
men whom he did know and on whom he was forced to rely daily, Stimson,
Leahy and Marshall, were obsessed with the military raflier than the political
implications of the war. At the fust Gabinet meeting, Truman told his
inherited advisers that his intention was to continue both the foreign and
the domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration. Lacking any policies
of his own, he really had little alternative.'^® Leahy tells us that Tmman
took a firm stand that "commitments already entered into must be upheld.""
He labored under a sense of obligation to continue in the steps of his
predecessor.'®
During the early months of his Presidency, Truman made a conscious
effort to appear decisive. But, until the war ended, until he freed himself
from Roosevelt's encumbering legacy, he was, in fact, at the mercy of

events. To compensate for his lack of experience, his inadequate knowledge,
and his profound concern over his ability to do the job so suddenly thrust
upon him, Truman relied upon those advisers who offered decisive advice.
The image of Truman as a tough-minded, confident President, the man who
displayed a sign on his desk reading, "The Buck Stops Here!" was one he
cultivated after the war was over.'® It was perhaps symbolic of his situation
that when, a few days after his inauguration. President Tnjman entered the
East Room of tlie White House for Roosevelt's funeral service, no one stood
up. As Robert E. Sherwood noted, "AU they could think of was that the
President was dead. But eveiybody stood up when Mrs. Roosevelt came in.""
Did Truman intentionally avoid all responsibility? For the most part,
circumstances prevailed, and he operated, at least initially, in a sort of
vacuum. Often the real grist of the information needed to make a decision
never entered his domain, having been filtered through channels such as
the Interim Gommittee or the Science Advisory Panel or was altered by
'
Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed—The Atomic Bomb and the Grand
Alliance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), p. 144.
® Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, The Truman Administration: A
Documentary History (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 2.
° Cabell Phillips, p. 71.
"Martin Sherwin, p. 149; Cabell Phillips, p. 71; Harry S Truman, Memoirs, p. 9.
"William Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House Publishers, 1956),
p. 349.
"Cabell Philhps, p. 71.
"Martin Sherwin, p. 147.
"Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & Row,
1950), p. 881; See also Sherwin, p. 148.
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gate-keeping praetices on lower levels, as in the case of the Franek Report
of June 1945 and Leo Szilard's petition of July 17, 1945, both of which

reflected an opposing viewA® Therefore, his position on the bomb developed
without benefit of full knowledge of prior diplomatic activities and in
response to the situation as presented by his advisers. Obviously, this was
not an example of enlightened decision-making. Truman's role was reduced
to little more than a ceremonial function. As President and commander-in-

chief, he was merely the nominal leader of military action and as such,
yielded to the expertise of those who knew better. His was decision by
default.

One conclusion that emerges elearly from a elose examination of wartime
policy formulation is that policymakers never seriously questioned the
assumption that the bomb should be used. From the first meeting to
organize the atomic energy project in October 1941, Stimson, Roosevelt
and other members of the Top Policy Group conceived of the development
and use of the atomic bomb as an essential part of the total war effort.^®
They asked whether it would be ready in time, not whether it should be
used if it was ready; what were the diplomatic consequences of its develop
ment, not the moral implications of its military use.^'' Although the sug
gestion to build the bomb was initially made by scientists who feared that
Germany might develop the weapon first, those with political responsibihty for prosecuting the war accepted the veiy fact of the bomb's existence
as sufficient justification for its use against the enemy.^® Winston Ghurchill
stated: "The historic fact remains and must be judged in the aftertime,
that the decision whether or not to use the A-bomb to compel the surrender
of Japan was never an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned
agreement around our table; nor did 1 ever hear the slightest suggestion that
we should do otherwise."^" Secretary of War Stimson wrote, "It was our
common objective throughout the war to be first to produce an atomic
weapon and use it."-® Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientist in charge
of making the bombs at Los Alamos, said, "We always assumed if they
[bombs] were needed, they would be used.''^^ At the last meeting between
Stimson and Roosevelt on March 15, 1945, a few weeks before his death,
neither man expressed any doubts as to whether the bomb would or should
be used.22 -phg problem-solving natm-e of the question related to the bomb
itself—not to the stategic value. We have it—will it work was the issue.
Early in the summer of 1941 the Rritish government forwarded to
Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Develop
ment, a copy of the MAUD Gommittee's report entitled, "The Use of
Uranium for a Bomb," which held out the possibility that plutonium could
be used for a bomb; that plutonium or uranium bombs could be made small
Martin Sherwin, p. 212; See also Bernstein and Matusow, pp. 16, 17.
Martin Sherwin, pp. 37, 42.
"Ibid., pp. 194, 195.
>Mbid., p. 5.

"Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1953), p. 639.

Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision To Use The Bomb," Harpers Magazine,
February 1947, p. 98.
^Ibid.

Martin Sherwin, p. 138.
="lbid., p. 35.
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enough to cany in existing aircraft; and finally, that a bomb could be pro
duced within two years. Bush informed Roosevelt on July 16, 1941, and
aldiough the matter was "still highly abstruse," Bush considered, "one thing
certain: if such an explosive were made it would be thousands of times more
powerful than existing explosives, and its use might be determining."^''
Likewise, from Secretary Stimson's point of view, the atomic bomb had this
unique pecularity. He mused the day before Roosevelt died, "although
every prophecy thus far has been fulfilled by the development and we can
see that success is 99% assured, yet only by the first aetual war trial of the
weapon ean the actual certainty be fixed."^® Charles Sherwin notes that
Truman did not inherit the question of whether that certainty ought to be
fixed; he inherited the answer.
Incremental Decision-Making

At first glance, the decision to drop the atomic bomb would appear to
be one of the largest and most consequential decisions a nation might make,
yet the pattern is incremental. Braybrooke and Lindblom point out, not
sm'prisingly, that incrementalism is central and fundamental to the demo
cratic system, even if it does not wholly characterize it. Policy making
proceeds tlrrough a sequence of approximations. A policy is directed at a
problem; it is ti'ied, altered, tried in its altered form, altered again, and so
forth. In short, incremental policies follow one upon the other in the
solution to a given problem.^''' Just how far the practice of incremental
politics permeates the activity of our government can be illustrated even by
decisions that, on superficial inspection, appear to be nonincremental.^®
Braybrooke and Lindblom suggest that since policy analysis is incremental,
it is to be expected that stable long-term aspirations will not appear as
dominant critical values in the eyes of the analyst.^" Truman,for example,
made his decision almost exclusively on the basis of the more immediate
military and calculable criteria. As a typically pragmatic American politician,
he dealt with the tangible features of the situation, the immediately probable
results: to end the war; to save American hves; to continue the AngloAmerican entente; to achieve atomic supremacy; and to create a diplomatic
bargaining wedge with Russia. Inevitably, his bias was toward the more
short-mn and controllable elements of the equation. No matter how com

pelling the longer-term implications of dropping tlie bomb might have
seemed, they posed such high imponderables and contingencies that they
defied easy calculation. The bias was toward immediate results, short-run
implications, calculable sequences of action.®" As we now see, the use of
the bomb flowed out of the momentum of events, out of the locked-in quality

_

of men and institutions who, once committed, saw no way to rean^pg^Jjljgg SECTiyTsJ.
priorities and decision.®^

^ Ibid., pp. 36, 37.
= Ibid., p. 140.

"
Ibid.
"Braybrooke and Lindblom, p. 73.
"Ibid., p. 75.

1 M \ ^-8
STATE
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'"Ibid., p. 102.

™ James MacGregor Bums, Presidential Government, The Crucible of Leadership,
2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 216.
■'' Gar Alperovitz, "The Use of the Atomic Bomb" in The Origins of the Cold
War, 2nd ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Lexington: D. G. Heath & Go., 1974), p. 56.
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During the seven months between the Hyde Park Conference in Sep
tember 1944 and Roosevelt's death, steady progress had been made on the
development of the bomb at Los Alamos and the other facilities of the
Manhattan Project. In a memorandum written about two weeks before
Roosevelt died, General Groves expressed his confident opinion that atomic
weapons would be available in time to use against Japan. He was certain
that the weapon would bring the war to a rapid conclusion, thereby justify
ing the years of effort, the vast expenditures, and the judgment of the
officials responsible for the project. Two bombs would be ready by August
1, 1945. Even before Truman took office, the race for the bomb had already
changed from a race against Gei-man scientists to a race against the war
itself. "I don't think there was any time where we worked harder at the
speed-up than in the period after the German surrender and the actual

combat use of the bomb," Oppe'nheimer recalled after the war.®Already in December, 1944, President Roosevelt was shown a report pre
pared by Groves for General Marshall, outlining the expected schedule for
production of atomic bombs. At least one bomb that did not requiie testing
would be ready by August 1, 1945. Another, less reliable weapon would be
available in July for testing. Plans were already underway for training the
crews of the 509th Composite Group for tlieir mission against Japan. All
these items Roosevelt approved.®'' This was seven months before the
A-bomb decision was credited to Harry Truman.
The evolution of the famous Interim Committee was in answer to the

need for an evaluative body, to serve in an advisory capacity to the
President on atomic energy.®® Stimson sought to keep it small enough
to carry on meaningful discussion but sufficiently varied in its membership
to represent all the relevant policy making segments of the Executive Branch,
to include individuals familiar with atomic energy problems, and finally, to
have influence with the President. On May 31, 1945, three days after
Truman set the date for the Potsdam Conference, the Interim Committee

(so named by Stimson so as to assure legislators that this was a temporary
body and that the Executive was not trying to usurp Congressional au
thority) submitted a formal recommendation that the atomic bomb be
used without warning against Japan.®® The Committee had met officially
on three previous occasions: May 9, 14 and 18.®'^ Its members had reviewed

the history of the Manhattan Project; received a background briefing from
Groves, Bush, Conant and others; discussed the Quebec Agreement and the
Combined Development Trust; appointed a Scientific Panel; considered the
appointment of industrial and military panels; and designated William L.
Laurence, science editor of The New York Times, to prepare statements to
be used after the atomic attacks.

Yet tlie question of whether the bomb should be used at aH had never

actually been discussed.®® The minutes of the Interim Committee suggest
why. These committee members had come together as advocates, the re
sponsible advisers of a new force in the world, convinced of the weapon's
Martin Sherwin, p. 145.
Ibid., pp. 133, 231.
Mbid., p. 133.
® Ibid., p. 166.
"Ibid., p. 169.
'Ibid., p. 202.
"Ibid., p. 203.

34 TT. -• J

__
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diplomatic and military potential, aware of its fantastic cost, and awed by
their responsibilities. Four years of war and the pressures to end it, four
years of secrecy and the prospect of more, two billion dollars and the
question for what?; Japan's tenacious resistance and America's commitment
to unconditional surrender; Soviet behavior and the need for international
control—all these bolstered the accepted point of view.®® There is no
suggestion in the memorandum of May 30, 1945, unearthed by Sherwin,
or in the questions the Secretary of War Stimson placed before the assembled
group, that his memory was serving him well when he wrote in his auto

biography: "The first and greatest problem (for the Interim Committee)
was the decision on the use of the bomb—should it be used against the
Japanese and if so, in what manner?"^® The fact is that a discussion of this
question was placed on the agenda only after it was raised casually in the
course of conversation during lunch.''i Arthur Compton reports in a sum
mary of the morning session of the Interim Committee on May 31,"Through
out the morning's discussion, it seemed to be a forgone conclusion that the
bomb would be used. It was regarding only the details of strategy and
tactics that differing views were expressed."^®
Stimson accepted Conant's suggestion that the most desirable target
would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely
surrounded by workers' homes. No member of the Committee spoke to the
conti-adiction between this conclusion and their earlier decision not to
concentrate on a civilian area.''® The critical discussion was over. It had not

only confirmed the assumption that the new weapon was to be used, but
that the two bombs that would be available early in August should be
used. Sherwin points out that the destruction of both Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was the result of a single decision.'^ The next day, Byrnes sug
gested that the Secretary of War should be advised that the members of the
Interim Committee agreed: ". . . while recognizing that the final selection
of the target was essentially a military decision, the present view of the Com
mittee was that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible;
that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes; and that it be
used without prior warning."*'® On June 6, 1945, Stimson informed Truman
of the Committee's decision.

Nearly two weeks after the Interim Committee's recommendation, on
June 12, James Franck, a Nobel Laureate, tried to present a report to the
Seeretary of War from the Committee on Social and Political Implications,
composed of seven scientists in Chicago who had worked on the preparation
of the nuelear explosive, plutonium. He managed to see only a lieutenant in
the office of Ceorge Harrison, alternate chairman of the Interim Committee.
This report, which became known as the Franek Report, argued for a
demonstration of the weapon on the desert or a barren island, before the eyes
=« Ibid.

"Ibid., p. 204; See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 617.
"Martin Sherwin, p. 204.
"Arthur H. Compton, Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative (New York: Oxford
University Tress, 1956), p. 238.
"Martin Sherwin, p. 209.
"Ibid.

"Ibid., p. 302 (Appendix L: Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting, May 31,
1945).
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of representatives of all the United Nations, suggesting that "the military
advantage of saving lives achieved by the sudden use of A-bombs against
Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and be a wave
of horror and repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world and even at
home."^® Yet the Scientific Panel reported to Stimson on June 16 that they
could "propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to
the war ... no acceptable alternative to direct mihtary use."^'^ Ends versus
means, as Braybrooke and Lindblom point out, characterizes incrementalism.
The evidence suggests that the use of the A-bomb became an end in itself
versus the moral and political impact which the bomb might generate after
the war.

Incremental decision-making is more than a simple sequence of rhetorical

events. As characterized by the rhetoric surrounding Truman's decision to
deploy the atomic bomb, incrementalism reflected a series of planned policy
approximations, interlocked in a budding-block effect to strengthen a sense
of false security and control over the impending outcome of the decision and
with misplaced emphasis on immediate ends rather than long-range goals.
Even Truman's unwillingness to act decisively was itself a form of incre
mental decision-making.
Conclusion

As John Kennedy observed, "The essence of ultimate decision remains
impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself. . . .
There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making
process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved."^®
It may remain largely a question of values as to the final assessment of
Truman's A-bomb decision. Yet, it must be recognized that the uninter-

mpted flow of incremental decision-making surrounding the use of the
atomic bomb facilitated a politics of expediency which denied the inclusion
of rhetorical alternatives. "This was not Truman's finest hour. His reluctance

to break with the Roosevelt precedent of support for the bomb's develop
ment nullified his claim to active participation in the decision and rendered
it impotent. Truman admittedly was caught in the momentum of events.
The juggernaut was advancing irrestistably toward the bombing of Japan.
A strong presidential decision, however, would have indicated his willingness
and tested his ability to control the outcome. Instead, the power of the
Presidency was reduced to consent by resignation. Truman remained only
a figurehead in the process, one who danced to the tune of the piper. But
the price he paid was not his to give. More than one hundi'ed twenty
thousand Japanese and, as Sherwin notes, an undisclosed number of Ameri
can POWs lay dead and dying in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—
unsuspecting victims of the holocaust, who bore tlie pains of tlie nuclear
birth.^®

"The Franck Report" in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, I, May 1946, pp.
2-A, 16.
"Martin Sherwin, p. 304 (Appendix M: Science Panel Recommendations on
the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, June 16, 1945).

'^John F. Kennedy, "Preface" to Theodore Sorensen, Decision-Making in the
White House: The Olive Branch and the Arrows (New York: Columbia Uni
versity Press, 1963).
"Martin Sherwin, pp. 232, 232n, 234.

https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol15/iss4/1

10

et al.: Complete Issue 15(4)
SPEAKER AND GAVEL

79

If the radiance of a thousand suns

Were to burst at once into the sky,
That would be like the splendor of
the Mighty One . . .
I am become Death
The Shatterer of Worlds.

Bhagavad-Gita

ATTENTION!!! 1975-76 DSR-TKA INITIATES

Your complimentary subscription
probably ENDS with this issue!
To continue receiving

Speaker

and

Gavel

you must subscribe—
Order by sending $5 to:
Speaker and Gavel
Allen Press
P.O. Box 368

Lawrence, Kansas 66044

NEW ADDRESS FOR OUR NATIONAL SECRETARY
Effective now:

Professor Bertram W. Gross

Secretary, DSR-TKA
Department of Speech
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SPEAKER AND GAVEL

GOOD DELIBERATIVE FORM
H. L. Ewbank

Edmund Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774 described the

English Parliament as a "deliberative assembly," that is, a group of people
who meet under certain conditions to discuss and determine common

actions. Those conditions for meeting include the following: an autonomous
group, large enough to warrant some degree of formality, meeting to share
opinions and ideas in order to reach a decision concerning a course or
courses of action determined through the votes of members, recognizing
that failure of any member to concur does not constitute withdrawal from
the assembly.^
The aggregation of common law, statute law, rituals and rules which

have come to be known as "parliamentary procedure" constitutes the basis
for proper behavior in deliberative assemblies, which make up a sub
stantial element of our democratic society. They range from governmental
bodies at the several levels to interest groups, social clubs, and voluntary
organizations of all sorts. The forms, the concerns, the sizes, and the mem

bers of these assembhes differ widely from each other. Specific rules pre
scribing appropriate actions in any given group necessarily differ along a
comparable range. As individuals seek to learn how to participate effectively
in such deliberative assemblies, any of three possible paths might appear
useful.

One might undertake to learn effective participation in a deliberative
group simply by becoming a member of such a group and actively observiiig

how they behave for some time before volunteering to speak. This is a
relatively unsatisfactory course of action, if for no other reason than that
one really needs to become sensitized to the significant elements of a situa
tion in order to know what to look and listen for. As Sidney Hook observed,
we learn through, not by, experience, "And what we learn through experi
ence is more likely to be valid when we confront experience with a prepared
mind. It is the cultivation and development of the prepared mind, and its
attendant functions of trained observation and disciplined imagination,
which is or should be the objective of all schooling, and especially schooling
on the college and university level."^
Some choose to join deliberative assemblies and to join in their problerhsolving activities from the start. This mode of beginning is disruptive to
the rest of the members, who then must translate the new member's con
tributions into messages with which tliey are prepared to deal, and, in all
probability, divert time from the substance of their considerations to an
explanation of the rules so that the new member will in time accommodate
himself to the usual ways of the organization.
A third and more direct way to leam to be a contributing member of a

dehberative assembly is to focus on the ways to prepare and to present
Professor H. L. Ewbank Is Professor of Speech Communication at the University
of Arizona.

^ Sarah Corbin Robert, et al., eds., Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised (Glenview: Scott Foresman and Company, 1970), p. xxvii, p. 1.

° Sidney Hook, "Conflict and Change in the Aeademic Community," in Sidney
Hook, ed.. In Defense of Academic Freedom (New York: Pegasus, 1971), p. 111.
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one's views concerning such problems as one might seek to resolve in that
type of group, or to focus on the rules which generally obtain as decisions
are sought. Intercollegiate forensics activities provide a means of imple
menting the former path. Participants explore agreed-upon problem areas
and organize their ideas according to agreed-upon rules which prescribe

form, sequence, and time restrictions. Courses in parliamentary procedure
constitute the usual way of studying the rules, using whatever subjectmatter might be convenient in order to gain experience and develop confi
dence in working within the patterns adopted by deliberative assemblies.
As one adopts either of these modes of study, his concern for one interest
is very likely to make him impatient with any problems engendered by the
other. Debaters, for instance, may become so engrossed in the substance of
their brief or their case that they object or refuse to devote the time and
effort necessary to adapt the substance to different organizational formats.
Students of parhamentary procedure may take the view that it doesn't make
any difference whether or not they use accurate information in their consider
ation of a matter, because they are interested primarily in using the rules
confidently. They ignore, in this instance, the fundamental parliamentary
principle that demands that they consider the reliability of information and
the validity of arguments as they determine whether they should adopt or
reject a proposal. As a practical matter, it is worse than useless to try to
deal with either form or substance without at the same time considering
the other.

Unhappily, evidence of this exclusive concern for form without relevance
to substance is not difficult to find. A recent issue of the Speaker and Gavel
included, without comment or embellishment, a table of parliamentary
motions.3 In similar fashion, the text prepared under the auspices of Tau
Kappa Alpha before the merger with Delta Sigma Rho, entitled Argumen
tation and Debate: Principles and Practices, included an appendix which
was a "Simplified Classification Chart for Parliamentary Law," contributed
by Robert Allen.'' A scan of the index affirms that these are tlie only pages
bearing reference to parliamentary law or procedure. Even the description

of a parliamentary debate was simply a nan-ative indicating what might
transpire in a debate with the British, but contributing little to the under
standing of where and how parhamentary motions and laws are germane to
debate—either as practiced in intercollegiate competition or by those en
gaged directly in the deliberative assemblies for which such activity is
expected to provide valuable experience.
When we realize that it is at least unwise if not hterally impossible to
learn to deal with substance apart from form or form apart from substance,
it becomes apparent that the traditions of parliamentary rules and pro
cedures are part and parcel of today's forensics enterprise. Numbers of the
basic assumptions and practices of intercollegiate debate and forensics events
rest in the province of parliamentary common law or parliamentary rules.
One of the most basic rules of intercollegiate debate requhes that speakers
confine their remarks to one subject at a time. The question of "topicality"
which may now be raised by the jargon-bound debater reaehes back through
the question of "germaneness" that may be raised as a point of order in any
parliamentary meeting to the rule found in the Journal of the House of
'Speaker and Gavel, 14 (1977), 98.

^David Potter, ed.. Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices (New
York: Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 457-^59.

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
13

Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [], Art. 1
82

SPEAKER AND GAVEL

Commons requiring that: "When a Motion has been made, that Matter
must receive a Determination by the Question, or be laid aside by the
general sense of the House, before another be entertained."® The pattern of
alternating speakers supporting opposite points of vie-w was adopted in
1592, as the Journal carried the notice tlrat: "It was made a Rule, That
the Chair-man shall ask the Parties that would speak, on which side they
would speak . . . and the Party that speaketh against the last Speaker, is to

be heard first."® And the practice of ad hominem argument was proscribed
soon after, in 1604, through the provision that: "He that digresseth from
the Matter to fall upon the Person, ought to be suppressed by the Speaker.
. .. No reviling or nipping words must be used.'"'
These primary considerations of debating find contemporary restatement
within the first few pages of one of the most recently published debate
texts. Wayne N. Thompson reminds us that debate is both cooperative and
investigative. Debate, he says, "systematically presents and contrasts the
affirmative and negative sides. . . ." There are hearers, in addition to the
debaters themselves (even if only a tournament judge) whose appraisal and
acceptance of arguments, opinions, and ideas is sought. "In debate,"
Thompson summarizes, "the intellectual task is to test a single proposition
by following a procedure previously agreed upon."®
One of the universal principles of parHamentary law is that each delibera
tive assembly has the God-given right to determine its own rules, and,
corollary to that right, the responsibility to agree upon the rules before they
are to take effect, i.e., there must be no ex post facto penalty or punishment.

This principle gives rise to differences among deliberative assemblies as well
as to the variety of forms and formats which have been developed for inter
collegiate debate. It points up, too, the responsibility for each participaiit
to discover and comprehend the rules under which he is to perform. He
needs to develop facihty in adapting his own performance to the rules
and practices of different situations such as tournament competition, public
debating dealing with civil or political issues of the day, or, perhaps, par

ticipation in student government pohcy-making.
Within tlie province of competitive debating, the TKA text previously
referred to lists three major alternatives to the standard, or traditional
format: the problem-solving debate, cross-examination or Oregon-style
debate, and legislative debate. Procedm'al rules for direct clash, heckling,
mock trial, and split-team debate are provided briefly. Obviously, the dis

tinctions between these several forms lie in the rules rather than in the
substance under consideration. The stated aim of varying forms was "to
produce more realistic setting and treatment" for the debaters themselves,
and "to involve the audience directly and actively in the discussion."® Thus
they were intended to provide students with experience applicable to the
variety of deliberative assemblies which they would encounter elsewhere.
The problem-solving debate format did not gain wide acceptance, and
has been superseded in intercollegiate forensics by the discussion event.
Indeed, because the procedure provided that the topic was to be stated
^ Robert, Robert's Rules, p. xxxi.
"Ibid.
'
Ibid.

® Wayne N. Thompson, Modern Argumentation and Debate: Principles and
Practices (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 8.

"Gilford Blyton, "The Problem-Solving Debate in Potter, Argumentation, p. 251.
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as a question, rather than a proposition, there was little difference between

tlie two. The team was comprised of two or three speakers, and designated
"A" or "B," rather than "Affirmative" or "Negative." Teams received their
designation, which served only to determine speaking sequence, just before
the event. Team "A" speakers were to appear first, third, and sixth. Team
"B" appeared second, fourth, and fifth, thereby maintaining the tradition
that the initiator of debate is permitted the closing remarks. In each in
stance, the first speaker was to present an unbiased analysis of the problem,
including background and facts necessaiy to an understanding of it. When
time permitted, he was to present a set of criteria by which solutions might
be judged. Ten minutes was alloted for this analysis. Each second speaker
presented a solution and demonstrated why it was the best, and how it would
solve the problem as initially described. Twelve minutes were allotted for
this presentation, followed by an eight-minute speech by the third speaker
(or the first, again, if only two were on the team) in which he was to
evaluate the solutions already presented and explain why one was superior.

He might question other speakers for clarification, might agree or disagree
with the proposal of his colleague, and could, if the situation warranted, set
forth an entirely new solution. If the debate was to he judged, "scientific
research, an unbiased point of view, and cooperative thinking" were to be
the bases for determining which team did the better job.^® It seems apparent
that these rules were conceived in such a way tliat they promote achievement
of certain desired substantive goals, but the goals themselves were not so
competitively oriented as other forms of debate. (This may well explain
the lack of acceptance of the problem-solving format.)
Cross-examination debate, on the other hand, has gained widespread
adoption, especially in high school competition. It has been hailed as
better adapted to training for "tliinking on your feet" and as a procedure
which is more interesting for audiences.
Precise parliamentary rules for cross-examination debate vaiy consider
ably. The initial "Oregon" format was initiated by twenty-minute presenta
tions of the entire affirmative and the entire negative cases. Ten-minute
question periods followed, with the second negative interrogating the first
affirmative, followed by the first negative responding to questions from the
second affirmative. The second speakers closed with ten minutes of refuta
tion and summary by the negative and affirmative in sequence. The com
plete debate, then, occupied one hour and twenty minutes.
Variations in the rules of cross-examination debate are many. Most
provide for one constructive speech from each of four speakers, followed by
a question period by that member of the opposition who is not to be
the ensuing speaker, and one summary-rebuttal speech from each side.
Speaking times vary from five to twelve minutes; questioning times range
from four to eight minutes, usually approximating half of the speaking time;
and summary-rebuttals are allotted three to eight minutes. One format
used by the University of Michigan provided for a single constructive speech
from each side, followed by opposition questions, followed by an equal
period for audience questioning and concluding with a brief rejoinder by
each side.

Throughout the range of rules respecting time limits there persists the more
general parliamentary traditions of "platform decorum," courtesy, fairness in
intent of questions and in the extent of answers, relevancy, and finally, the
'Blyton, "Problem-Solving Debate," pp. 251-255.
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authority of the judge or the chair to act as final arbiter of any dispute or
appeal. Descriptions note that the chair in a cross-examination style debate is
much more important than the chair for a traditional debate. "The chair
man should not only set the tone for a friendly, courteous contest but should
also see that each speaker receives fair play. The chief responsibility of
the chairman is the enforcement of the rules of the contest, and he should
familiarize himself with them." This, of course, is identical with the ex
pectations for the chah of any other parliamentary situation.
Legislative debate designates those varieties of forensics events which

include larger numbers of participants, provide for more than one step in
a problem-solution process, operate under an accepted set of rules, and are
presided over by an officer or officers who have been delegated to direct
the work of the group according to those rules. The National Student
Congress of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha is an exemplar of this style.
Its rules are necessarily more complex and detailed than those of the styles
described above, because more people are engaged in the process, and the
process itself involves four distinct and discrete organizational structures
dealing with several different problem areas, which must interact effectively
in order for the process to be complete. The many participants, most of
whom are previously unknown to each other, must be guided in appropriate
ways to get together, to organize themselves with respect to parties and
committees and with respect to the agenda and proper functioning of the

legislative assembly itself. Because the total available time is severely
limited, each element of the process must be circumscribed and clarified so
that the rules will serve to facilitate consideration of the substantive matters,
rather than becoming the focus of greatest concem.^^
The purposes cited at the outset of the Rules affirm that this event will
provide experience in a situation which is "realistic." It parallels the organi
zation and operation of legislative bodies at the state and national levels.
Procedures and mles employed in the legislative debate in the Student
Congress mirror those of Congress, except for such modifications as are
necessitated by the demand • that all organization, determination, and
decision occur within a matter of days. The press of time makes it all the
more important that members be familiar not only with the specific rules
but also with the philosophy and spirit of parliamentary rules of deliberative
assembhes in general. A table of motions alone, or even such a table supple
mented by the Rules of the National Student Congress, will not provide
adequate and reliable support for effective participation in the Congress.
Only prior study of or experience in organizing politically for elections, draft
ing and redrafting legislative bills in committee, and debating those bills in
a deliberative assembly can clarify the interdependence between the ideas
considered and the principles and procedures which govern their consider
ation.

A similar, but identifiably different version of legislative—or, more pre
cisely, "parliamentary"—debate is now practiced at the University of Toronto
and the University of Chicago. Their format provides for a traditional
"Emil R. Pfister, "Cross-Examination, or Oregon-Style, Debate," in Potter,
Argumentation, pp. 256-262.

"Paul R. Brandes, "Legislative Debate Procedure," in Potter, Argumentation,
pp. 262—272.
"Speaker and Gavel, 14 (1977), 33-41 prints the Rules of the National Student
Congress of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha.
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parliamentary seating, with speakers for the Government (the affirmative
of the proposition) seated to the left of the House as one faces front, and
the Opposition speakers on the right. The Government opens the debate with
an eight minute statement by the first speaker, who is Prime Minister. He
is followed by one speaker for the Opposition, and a second Government
spokesman who are granted the same amount of time. The second, and
final speaker for the Opposition, who is Leader of the Opposition, then has
eleven minutes, followed by a three-minute rebuttal by the Prime Minister.

Procedural rules demand that all remarks be addressed to the Speaker
of the House, who is the judge of the event. No speaker is to be addressed
or referred to by name, and each is to commence his remarks only after being
called upon by the Speaker. It is the responsibility of the Government to set
forth reasonable definitions of the tems of the proposition early in the

debate. The Opposition may contest those definitions but will succeed only
by providing a more reasonable definition. Debate may be interrupted only
by a point of order or a point of personal privilege. No points of information
are permitted. The rules remind the participants that the point of order
"involves a breach of the procedure or the customs of the House. It includes
such things as unparliamentary language, and introducing new affirmative
arguments during rebuttal." The point of personal privilege may be raised
only on one's own behalf, "when a speaker feels that his speech has been
materially misrepresented or when he feels that his character has been

defamed." The Speaker is empowered to rule on such points, and speakers
are cautioned that they must not be frivolous in their use of points of order
or personal privilege, but reassured that the mere fact that a ruling might
go against them would not damage the case "if the objection appeared to

be reasonable and in good faith.''^^
Finally, in keeping with the traditions of the British and Ganadian Par

liaments, the Toronto rules provide that: "Heckling is permitted and it
should be remembered that heckling will enter into the evaluation. If a
speaker's heckle is irrelevant or flat it will be counted against him. Heckling
is a very important part of Parliamentary debating and the ability to make
timely and incisive heckles is a great asset to any debater. Heckling should
be short and to the point.''^® These rules are similar to those which were
provided for the "Heckling Debate" format described in the TKA text.
There it was noted that heckling "demands thorough knowledge of the
question and considerable poise and self-control on the part of the debater."
The purpose of heckling was explained as "intended to get at the heart of

the matter at issue, to demand specific evidence, to expose fallacies or the
like, never to waste time, to embarrass the speaker, or to inject irrelevancies."^®

Such explanations of proper purposes, attitudes and practices enable the
participant to develop a sense of what to expect and how to behave in order
to realize these expectations. As is true in any area of endeavor, there is
some parliamentary jargon—some words and phrases which have become
traditional in certain cucumstances, and which show familiarity and assur
ance as they are used. Fortunately, most of the jargon is straightforward.
""Rules of Debate," Mimeographed, Hart House, University of Toronto, Sep
tember, 1977, 3 pages.
^"Rules of Debate," p. 3.
"William E. Umbach, "Other Forms of Debate," in Potter, Argumentation, pp.
274-275.
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When, for instance, in a Student Congress one wants to propose an action
which is not possible under the usual rules, he has only to "move to suspend
the rules"; when he wants to reverse an earlier action, he moves to "rescind."
Even in those instances where terms are confusing, recognized and accepted

parliamentarians have proposed modern wording which may be used with
out fear of misunderstanding or of appearing naive. For example, after
debate has proceeded for some time in a Student Congress, and it appears
that numbers of participants are ready to vote, the motion, "I move that
we vote immediately," or "I move that we close debate" is acceptable in
form because it expresses clearly what is intended. If the presiding officer
then wishes to transpose the proposal to the more traditional phrase, "The
previous question has been moved," he may do so without any implied
criticism of tire member who offered the motion, and the other members

may well have a better understanding of what is intended than if the motion
had been initiated with the phrase, "I move the previous question.
A participant in any sort of a parliamentary meeting must know enough
of the principles underlying the rules to understand that the responsibilities
and the rights of each individual member are just the same as the re
sponsibilities of every other member. He does not need to be especially con
cerned about remembering which motions might demand a vote more sub
stantial than a simple majority of those voting. He should know that a simple
majority (over fifty percent) of the legal votes cast wiU affirm the adoption
of a motion. In certain instances by-laws might require that a majority
of those present must approve, though this is rare. Legislative bodies some
times demand a "constitutional majority" or a majority of the total member
ship for adoption of some kinds of legislation. In each case, every indi

vidual member may choose to vote or not to vote, but the effect of that
choice has different impacts on the results depending on the specific demands
of the situation. Similarly, in situations where the usual rights of members
will be limited in some way by the adoption of a motion (viz., the motion
to limit debate, to vote immediately, or to suspend rules) the usual provision
is to require the affirmative vote of more than a simple majority—usually
a two-thirds majority of those voting. The apparent reasonableness of this
cautious provision which assures that eleven members cannot force an im
mediate vote on ten others who want to continue the debate is brought into
some question when it is observed that the same rule permits the negative
vote of only eight members to prolong debate when thirteen are ready to
vote. And when it is extended to its ultimate, as it is when unanimity is
demanded, the collective will of all but one of the members is frustrated so

long as that one member refuses to agree. This is the ultimate in the
tyranny of the minority. It is a dietatorship.
So long as one is concerned with "trying to remember all of the rales" his
contribution to substantive decisions in a deliberative assembly will be
severely limited. Only after a good deal of thought and practice does one
gain the understanding and knowledge that gives him "the feel" of what
he is doing. Effective participation in forensics activities is akin to driving
a car, because each requires the coordination of a series of observations.
"Alice F. Sturgis, Sturgis' Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure, 2nd ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 67-70, substitutes the words "vote im
mediately" for "previous question" on grounds diat confusion wiU be decreased.
Ray E. Keesey, Modern Parliamentary Procedure (New York: Houghton-Mifflin,
1974), pp. 51-54, uses "close debate."
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instantaneous judgments, and coordinated movements, taking aecoimt of the
general laws, the individual circumstances, and the desired goal or desti
nation. The more experience one gains, the more automatically some of
the elements are accommodated and the more the conscious thoughts can
focus on getting done the substantive business that needs to he done. It is

only after a thorough understanding of the principles has been developed that
the summary charts of specific details about the motions are really useful
to reaffhm aspects which one can only partially recall and about which
some doubts may linger.
Real ease and skill in any activity or any game come only through the
understanding of reasons for doing things in specified ways. Research in
hbrary or laboratory is awkward and frustrating at fhst, until one discovers
that there is a pattern which saves time because it takes each necessary step
in tlie appropriate sequence, avoiding omissions and backtracking. While
one is learning this pattern she may need to make frequent reference to
the research guide or "rules." When she has arrived at the point where die
sequence is "natural," because she understands why each step is necessary,
and which follows what, she can devote her undivided attention to die

substance of what she is doing, rather than sharing attention between sub
stance and form. The system then begins to work for her. Similarly, when
one has come to understand die deliberative or parliamentaiy process she
does not have to refer constandy to the rules because she knows what needs

to be done. She simply and readily proceeds to do it.
It is, perhaps, too much to expect that each participant in forensics events
should have a semester's study of parliamentary procedure. Yet it cannot
be denied that a person who undertakes to participate—especially in a
legislative assembly—widiout having engaged in some conscious and serious
study of parliamentaiy procedure is at a definite competitive disadvantage.
Nor can it be denied that that person will decrease the efficiency and effect
iveness of the entire activity. The parliamentarily naive tend to be slow
to contribute, lest they display their lack of savoir faire. And worse, they
often take the position that the member who knows what she wants to do

and moves confidently to seek support for her proposals is, somehow, being
unfair as she demonstrates mastery of proper procedure. In fact, the indi
viduals who presume to participate in any deliberative assembly without
adequate comprehension of proper procedures are unfairly obstructing the
substantive deliberations of the assembly because of their inadequate mastery
of the forais those deliberations should take.
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Robert L. Com

Ruth A. Erickson
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Kay Bohannon Holley

David A. Smith
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Sam M. Smith

MERCER UNIVERSITY
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UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Barbe Ann Johnson
Karen Marie Olsen
Paul G. Ross

PACIFIC UNIVERSITY
Suzanne K. Nakama

Elizabeth L. Stanley
Curtis Y. Yokoo

Randy Curtis Trullinger
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY

Gary K. Bearing
Pamela F. Jamison
Alan P. Kurtzberg
M. Terry May
MURRAY STATE UNIVERSITY
Wes Bartlett

Laurie J. Beatty

Charles T. Riley
Jimmy Stubblefield
Isaac M. Thacker

Richard J. Thomas
Russell E. Walker

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKALINCOLN
Mark Flanders Adams

Virginia A. Eman
Martin J. Kuslmer
Jeffrey K. Lukehart
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA-RENO
Mark Broadhead
David S. Hoffman
Kim Perkins

Mark S. Westergard
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH ALABAMA

John V. Conway
Linda K. Gundlach
Helen L. Howard
Renard Ricks
Shauna E. Saliba

GoUeen A. Sparks
Jack L. White

Julia Geier
Charles D. Graeber
ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
Bob G. Griffo
Nathan E. Larkin
SOUTHERN METHODIST
UNIVERSITY
Charles K. Hauser
Brian D. MacLeod
Paul E. Staffeldt
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY
Beatrice L. Botelho
Marshall S. Ghannell
Catherine M. Gostanzo

Robert E. Gibbons

Brian R. Greeley
Alice Henderson

Brian F. McNulty
Donald W. Orcutt

John A. Ryder
Barbara J. Saint Andre
Ann M. Scheurer
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

Lewis Paul Snyder
TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY

Richard J. Lysiak
Melanie W. Neal

Vera L. Simpson
TULANE UNIVERSITY
Chris Austin
Mike Garbo

Alice Oppenheim
Barbara P. Wamick

OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE

April L. Adams
Arthuro R. Andrade
Richard W. BeU

Paul A. Garyotakis
Peter J. Marston
PACE UNIVERSITY
Mark Stehlik
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Michael R. Shumaker
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Kevin P. Peters
Martin R. Sadler

Layne William Weber
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
William Bruce Brannan
Randall R. Kucera
Shari D. Olenick

Sophia Eloise Wheeler
UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
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WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY
N. Elizabeth Bower

James A. McKowen
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

James T. Keffer
WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
David Mark Clarke

James H. Richards

Ferald J. Bryan
Heather W. Marshall

Patricia A. Murphy

WESTMINSTER COLLEGE

Joanne L. Smith

Martha K. Wilson
VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE

WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY
Denise Franklin

Rohhy W. Burke

John Hamhright

Charles T. Moses
Paul R. Thomas

Michelle Martin
Mark Parkinson
Robert Wilson

WASHINGTON AND JEFFERSON
COLLEGE

Dehra G. Logan
Sandra L. Rosenherger
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY
Darrell E. Garth
Scott L. Harris

Ruth E. Kay
Greg King
Rohin D. Myers

COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND
MARY

Monty Estis
John L. Gerner
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSINMADISON
Laurie K. Rohhins

Nancy Schultz

Michael F. O'Connor

John Anthony Pfeifer
Michael D. Wavada
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
Steven I. Peretz

Gregory Wilcox Powell

COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

Adele N. Rapport
YESHIVA UNIVERSITY
David A. Bart
Allen R. Friedman

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
23

Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [], Art. 1
92

SPEAKER AND GAVEL

DELTA SIGMA RHO-TAU KAPPA ALPHA
MINUTES OF NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING
November 2, 1978

Minneapolis, Minnesota

The meeting was called to order by President Thomas Kane at 9:05 p.m.
Present for all or part of the meeting were Kane, Weiss, Balthrop, Clark,
Ziegelmueller, Zarefsky, McGuire, Schnoor, Howe, Cornell, Matlon, R.

Flaningam, Lynch and Gross.
Report of the President: Thomas Kane. Kane announced that Woodrow
Leake had resigned as chair of the Research and Publications Committee.
Michael Overking has been appointed to replace Leake. The Nominating
Committee has been appointed as follows: Jack Lynch, chair, George
Ziegelmueller, Lucy Keele, Carl Flaningam, and Bill Balthrop. An ad hoc
committee to examine the By-Laws provisions for active chapters has been
appointed as follows: George Ziegelmueller, chair, Kenneth Andersen,
David Zarefsky, Jean Cornell, and Bert Gross.
Report of the Secretary: Bert Gross. The minutes of the previous meeting
were approved as published in Speaker and Gavel.
Report of the Treasurer: Jack Howe. The Society concluded the 1978
fiscal year in sound financial condition. Income for the fiscal year was
$12,021.91 and expenses were $8,372.64.
Reports were received from Regional Governors Weiss, McGuire, and
Schnoor.

Report of the Standards Committee: David Zarefsky. The Standards
Committee has received no new apphcations for chapters since last spring.
The disposition of the Committee's report on problem chapters which was
made last spring awaits the re-examination of the By-Laws by the newly
appointed ad hoc committee.
Report of the National Conference Committee: Cully Clark. The Na
tional Conference will be held at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia from
March 22—25, 1979. A discussion followed about the desirabihty of con
tinuing to have a banquet at the National Conference. The consensus of
the Council supported the continuation of the banquet. Clark noted that
the prices of trophies from Balfour had become excessive. An effort would
be made to locate another supplier who would provide similar quality awards
at lower prices.
A discussion of the financial status of the National Conference ensued.

Clark observed that a final statement had not yet been received for the
1978 Conference, but that it was possible that a deficit had been incurred
due to the weather. Howe recalled that he had paid a bill for $68.64 for
a deficit from the 1977 Conference even though the budget did not include
such an item. Clark/McGuire moved that the Treasm-er be authorized to

pay any deficit incurred by the 1978 National Conference. The motion
passed. Ziegelmueller/Lynch moved the following: It is the sense of the
National Council that the National Conference be self-supporting. However,
the Treasurer is authorized to pay up to $250 to cover any deficits which
are incurred. The motion passed.
Report of the Alumni and Service Awards Committee: Ron Matlon. A
letter soliciting nominations will be mailed shortly by the Secretary. A dis-
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cussion ensued about the desirability of having the award recipients attend
the banquet at the National Conference.

Report of the Speaker of the Year Committee; Bill Balthrop. A number
of nominations have been received as a result of the first announcement by
the committee. A second announcement will be made. In the discussion

which followed, aU agreed that it would be desirable to have the Speaker
of the Year attend the National Conference banquet. It was noted that the
Council had earher authorized paying the expenses of the person to be
honored.

The size of the Speaker of the Year committee was discussed. Ziegelmueller/Howe moved that the National Council authorize the Secretary to
prepare an amendment to the By-Laws to make the Speaker of the Year
Committee a five member committee. The motion passed. (PLEASE NOTE
THAT A COPY OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS ATTACHED.)
There being no further business to come before the Council, President
Kane declared the meeting adjourned at 10:10 p.m.
Respectfully submitted,
Bertram W. Gross, Secretary
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE BY-LAWS

A proposal to amend the By-Laws, Article H, Section 5 by deleting "at
least fifteen and not more than twenty" and inserting "five."
Section 5 currently reads: "This committee will consist of at least fifteen

and not more than twenty members, geographically distributed, who will
serve for a term of two years. The committee will be charged with the
selection of the Speaker of the Year in accordance with the rules approved
by the National Council."
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW EDITOR
William Balthrop of the University of North Carolina is the new editor
of Speaker and Gavel. President Thomas Kane made the announcement at
the Speech Communication Association National Convention in Minneapolis
in early November. Editor Balthrop begins his three-year term with the
Fall, 1978 issue. All manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be
sent to the new editor.

As an editor, I have profited from the services of many people. Professors'
Bernard Brock and Kurt Bitter served for three years as members of the
Editorial Board. John P. Davidson during his tenure as Second Student,
Vice-President was practically an Associate Editor for some issues as was
Mae Jean Go, former National Student President. Many people in the
Department of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois con
tributed to the journal. Jerri Moorman, Sharon Medlock, June Lenenski and
Sharon Perschnick retyped many articles before they were sent off to the

printer. Often they helped with proofreading as well as normal corre
spondence. Their willingness to help in a measure far beyond that which
would be expected is warmly appreciated. Ruth Bowman, Administrative
Secretary for the Department, helped in many respects, giving both sage
advise and specific aid on editorial matters.
A special; word of appreciation must go to those who submitted essays
for pubhcation. We were forced to reject many essays which vvere of good
quality.. And the Editorial Board appreciated those who cared enough to
write the Board, whether in praise or condemnation. •
I have enjoyed my period of service with Speaker-and Gavel. The Journal
plays an important role in Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha and it has
been a privilege to serve the society in this way.—Kenneth E. Andersen.
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SPECIAL SALE

Current Criticism

Individual copies of Current Cr/ficism ore available to readers of
this journal at a 20% discount from now until December 31, 1978.
The special price will be $2.00 per copy provided payment is sent
with the order.

Current Criticism may be adopted as a text in courses in criticism
and contemporary public discourse. Examination copies are avail
able on request and discounts available on quantity orders.

Order from Kenneth E. Andersen, Editor, Speaker and Gavel,
Department of Speech Communication, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801 or Bert Gross, National Secretary, DSR-TKA,
Department of Speech Communication, University of Georgia,
Athens, Georgia 30602.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
Tlie Delta Sigma Rlio-Tau Kappa Alpha National Council has established
a standard subscription rate of $5.00 per year for Speaker and Gavel.

Present policy provides that new members, upon election, are provided
with two years of Speaker and Gavel free of charge. Life members, further
more, who have paid a Life Patron alumni membership fee of $100, likewise
regularly receive Speaker and Gavel. Also receiving each issue are the cur
rent chapter sponsors and the libraries of institutions holding a charter in the
organization.

Other individuals and libraries are welcome to subscribe to Speaker and
Gavel. Subscription orders should be sent to Allen Press, P. O. Bo.x 368,
Lawrence, Kansas 66044.

TO SPONSORS AND MEMBERS

Pleose send all communications relating
to initiotion, certificates of membership, key

orders, ond nomes of members to the

for $7.00. Prices Include Federal Tax. The
nomes of new members, those elected be-

tween September of one year and Sep-

Notionol Secretary. All requests for

tember of the following year, appear

authority to initiote and for emblems

in the Foil issue of SPEAKER and

should be sent to the National Secre-

GAVEL, According to present regu-

tory and should be accomponied by

lotions of the society, new members

check or money order.

receive SPEAKER ond GAVEL for two

Inasmuch as

all checks and money orders are for-

years following their initiation if they

warded by the Secretary to the No-

return the record form supplied them

tionol Treosurer, pleose moke them

to; "The Treosurer of Delta Sigma

*he time their application is op

Njy

Rho-Tou Koppo Alpha."

proved by the Executive Secretary
ond certified to the sponsor. Follow-

The membership fee is $15.00.|ing this time all members who wish

The official key (size shown in cut on
this page) is $10.50, or the official key-

pin is $11.75. A lopet button is ovailoble

to receive SPEAKER and GAVEL may
subscribe at the standard rote of $5.00

per yeor.
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